The Miranda warnings, known to anyone who has watched television in the past 30 years, sometimes give the public a false sense of security in dealing with the police. We seem to think that our rights will be protected. We think that the police diligently warn a suspect about the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. It even seems that the police are really looking out for our best interests and that they will will advise us that it may even be a bad idea to speak to the police. Of course, it is a bad idea to speak to the police and it should never be done by one who is possibly the target of an investigation. But the police, through the Miranda warnings, don't illustrate this point—on purpose. These warnings are not meant to deter the unknowing and involuntary confession. Instead, they are quickly read through and marginalized by the officer in an attempt to secure an unknowing confession. If that were not bad enough, the courts have routinely emasculated the sanctions for a failure to advise of the Miranda warning such to the point as to almost eviscerate the rule itself. Nevertheless, Miranda remains an important tool in the criminal defense lawyer's arsenal. It is a rule that must be understood properly and challenged vigorously.

The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." (U.S. Const. Amend. V.) In order to protect this constitutional guarantee, the United States Supreme Court established "concrete constitutional guidelines" in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444-45. (See Dickerson v. United States (2000) 530 U.S. 428, 435 [120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405].) Specifically, law enforcement officers must provide a suspect with four warnings (the "Miranda rights"): that a suspect "has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." (Id., citing Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 479.) In essence, "the accused must be adequately and effectively appraised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored." (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 467.)

The purpose of Miranda warnings is to protect individuals "swept . . . into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion . . . ." (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 461.) Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized that "the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals." (Id. at pp. 455-456.) In other words, custodial interrogation creates "inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he does not otherwise do so freely." (Id. at p. 467.) Thus, the prosecution may not use statements stemming from such an interrogation unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. (Id. at p. 444.)

An officer's obligation to provide Miranda warnings to a suspect before interrogation extends only to those instances where the individual is "in custody." (Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) 429 U.S. 492, 495(per curiam) [97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714]; Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444; People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 648.) The term "custody" encompasses any situation where a person has been arrested or otherwise deprived of his or her freedom of action in any significant way. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 679.) In other words, the inquiry focuses on whether "a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave." (People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 402.)

In determining whether a suspect was in custody, the court must evaluate the totality of circumstances, keeping in mind that no single factor is dispositive. (See People v. Spears (1991) 228 Cal.App. 3d 1, 23.) The California Supreme Court has noted, however, that significant considerations include:
(1) the site of the interrogation, (2) whether the investigation has focused on the subject, (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest are present, and (4) the length and form of questioning.

(Ibid.) Other relevant factors include whether the individual was informed that he was free to leave, whether the purpose of the interview was to question the person as a suspect or as a witness, and whether the officers were confrontational or accusatory. (See People v. Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1162 [listing various factors relevant to evaluating whether a suspect is in custody for purposes of Miranda].) The court must "look at the interplay and combined effect of all the circumstances to determine whether on balance they created a coercive atmosphere such that a reasonable person would have experienced a restraint tantamount to arrest." (Ibid.)

The United States Supreme Court has made clear that where officers deliberately withhold Miranda warnings before eliciting a confession from a suspect in custody, and then obtain a substantially similar confession after providing Miranda warnings, the post-warning statement must be excluded unless curative measures provided before the second statement "ensure that a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would understand the import and effect of the Miranda warning and of the Miranda waiver." (See, e.g., Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600, 622 [124 S.Ct. 2601, 15 L.Ed.2d 653] (Kennedy J., concurring.) In so holding, the Supreme Court recognized that "when Miranda warnings are inserted in the midst of coordinated and continuing interrogation, they are likely to mislead and deprive the defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them." (Id. at pp. 613-614, internal citations and quotations omitted [plurality opinion].) Indeed, the Court emphasized that the practice of "midstream" warnings "effectively threatens to thwart Miranda's purpose of reducing the risk that a coerced confession would be admitted." (Id. at p. 617 [plurality opinion].)

The end result of all this legal reasoning is that prior to trial, your Attorney should carefully scrutinize any statements made by the accused in conjunction with the actions of the police to determine whether or not there has been a violation of a suspect's rights. As is the case with many motions, a motion that is never filed can never be granted. An aggressive and intelligent trial lawyer with an appropriate knowledge of Miranda should be able to determine whether or not your statements can be suppressed your trial.

Your rights are important to us at the Law Offices of Keith J. Bruno. If you have been charged with a crime and would like to know more about whether or not a Miranda motion is appropriate in your case, contact the Orange County, Los Angeles, Riverside, San Bernardino and San Diego criminal defense firm of The Law Offices of Keith J. Bruno. We offer a free face-to-face consultation and can work out a payment plan in most situations. The Santa Ana, Orange County, California, law offices of Keith J. Bruno represents Californians who have been accused, charged, or arrested for criminal offenses in Orange County, Los Angeles, Riverside, San Bernardino and San Diego.